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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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This paper provides a methodology for categorizing 
public-private partnerships in infrastructure, based on the 
following key characteristics: whether the project involves 
new or existing business, the nature of the private sector’s 
construction obligations, the need for the private sector 
to mobilize significant private funding ab initio, the 
nature of the private sector’s service delivery obligations, 
and the source of the project revenue stream. The purpose 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Guarantees Unit, Finance Economics & Urban Department—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to develop best practice and latest technology in public private partnerships for infrastructure. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at jdelmon@worldbank.org.  
of this methodology is to facilitate mapping, referencing, 
cross-comparison, analytical studies, and descriptions 
of public-private partnerships in infrastructure projects 
with similar key characteristics across sector, commercial, 
regional, and geopolitical lines. The methodology is 
tested against 15 case studies representing different 
infrastructure sectors, regional applications, and 
commercial approaches to public-private partnerships. 
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“When I use a word” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”
2 
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errors or mistakes remain those of the author. 
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The following provides a categorization methodology for public-private 
partnerships
3 in infrastructure (PPP), classifying the different design options for 
PPP based on their most salient elements, those characteristics fundamental to the 
nature of PPP and therefore the character of the project in question.  Lack of an 
agreed categorization methodology has created confusion and limited the ability to 
cross-fertilize, learning lessons from different regions and sectors who use 
different terminology, making it difficult to know, without in-depth analysis, if the 
structures being used are similar or not. 
There is no universal norm as to the most appropriate approach to PPP. That 
analysis needs to be made on a country-by-country, sector-by-sector and project-
by-project basis. The model is therefore not meant to be normative, i.e. it does not 
identify which PPP option would be the most appropriate, most efficient or most 
effective nor does it try to be comprehensive (nor uncontrovercial). Instead, it 
serves three key purposes. It: 
  facilitates the task of practitioners when seeking to identify relevant 
lessons learned from other projects, sectors, countries, legal systems and 
cultures;  
  helps mapping, referencing and analytical studies by providing a practical, 
descriptive nomenclature; and 
  assists in the description of a given PPP structure, e.g. for policy or 
decision makers without the confusion of political, nationalistic or cultural 
labels often associated with other terminology. 
For example, when technical experts need to discuss PPP options with 
policymakers, using this classification model will facilitate the process by avoiding 
misunderstandings associated with tired or misused vocabulary. Equally, when 
designing PPP structures to fit the needs of a given country, sector or project, the 
design team will want to take advantage of the lessons learned from similar 
exercises. The model will help the application of lessons learned from other similar 
structures across the globe by identifying commonalities amongst those structures 
                                                 
3   This paper uses a broad definition of PPP to be relevant across the largest sample of 
projects.  6
and enabling the design team to utilize good practice associated with the relevant 
elements of those structures.  
The classification model addresses five key parameters that may or may not be 
relevant to any given PPP project.  These parameters identify the most fundamental 
characteristics of a PPP project.  
1.  New or existing business – taking over existing revenues, customers, 
assets or employees represents a different risk profile than a new 
business.  
2.  The nature of project company construction obligations – 
implementing a significant construction program carries with it a host 
of construction and performance related risks that will be essential to 
understanding the role of the project company.
4 This obligation differs 
fundamentally if it is a new build, or the refurbishment of existing 
assets. 
3.  The need for the project company to mobilize significant private 
funding ab initio - where the project company is required to mobilize 
private finance for any significant up-front costs (including fees, 
acquisition of assets and construction costs), the risk profile for the 
project company and the influence of the financiers will alter 
fundamentally the nature of the project.   
4.  The nature of the project company’s service delivery obligations – 
refers to the extent to which the project company is delivering services 
directly to consumers “User” or only to a single user, such as the utility 
“Bulk”. Delivery of services to a large number of consumers represents 
a more complex context for the project company, and its financiers. 
5.  The source of the project revenue stream – the source of the revenue 
stream influences the certainty, size and nature of that revenue stream, 
e.g. the collection risk associated with the revenue stream and the 
likelihood that the obligor will be available to pay on its obligations.  
“Fee” refers to a single or small number of purchasers of the offtake or 
                                                 
4   For ease of reference, this paper refers to the “grantor” as the public initiator of the 
project and the “project company” being the private company undertaking the project.  7
service, while “Tariffs” refers to collection of revenues from a large 
number of consumers or users. 







































For example, a project where the project company builds a new power plant, 
operates it and sells the power to the local utilities, would be a New-Build-Finance-
Bulk-Fee. The refurbishment of an existing hospital, financed by the project 
company, where the project company does not provide clinical services, but 
instead makes the refurbished hospital available to the local health authority for a 
fee and the grantor delivers clinical services out of the hospital. This project would 
be a New-Refurbish-Finance-Bulk-Fee. The management of an existing water 
company and refurbishment of assets, financed by the grantor, with revenues 
collected from the consumers, would be an Existing-Refurbish-User-Tariffs. The 
management of an existing waste management plant for the local utility with no 
capital expenditure, but an up-front concession fee, with revenues from anyone 
wanting to deposit waste at the facility, would be an Existing-Finance-Bulk-Tariffs.   8
1.  Introduction 
The public sector provides financing for the vast majority of infrastructure 
services.  The government analyzes, chooses, and implements policies intended to 
improve infrastructure delivery, increase access to financing, reduce waste and 
corruption, and develop the information and data to manage infrastructure 
effectively and efficiently.  Public-private partnerships in infrastructure (PPP) are 
one of the tools in a policymaker’s arsenal.
5 PPP, in this paper, means any 
contractual or legal relationship between public and private entities aimed at 
improving and/or expanding infrastructure services.   
The decision to adopt PPP must be political, first. The government must consider 
the political and social implications of PPP and whether there is sufficient political 
will to implement PPP. Next, consideration needs to be given to the institutional, 
legal and regulatory context - the extent to which government institutions have the 
needed skills and resources, the financial and commercial markets have needed 
capacity and appetite, and laws and regulations encourage or enable PPP - and 
whether changes need to be made to the institutional, legal and regulatory climate 
in order to provide the right context for PPP. Once these basic issues have been 
addressed, those designing the PPP solutions available to policymakers must 
consider the most commercially and financially viable and appropriate structures. 
This must involve consideration of cost benefit, value for money, the sources of 
finance, the commercial arrangements, the nature of investors and government 
participants, and a variety of other circumstances that need to be addressed in the 
design of appropriate PPP structures. This latter process is where a robust 
classification model can help.  
For too long the methods available for structuring the involvement of the private 
sector in the provision of infrastructure services has been constrained by the 
confusing lack of a common terminology.  We use terms such as privatization, 
divestiture, concession, lease, affermage, BOT, BOOT, ROT, BOO, ROO, DBO, 
RBO, DCMF, BTL, RTL, BTO, RTO, DBFO, PFI, outsourcing, delegation of 
services, management contract, operation and maintenance contract, service 
contract, operating contract, performance contract and the list goes on.  Yet there is 
                                                 
5   This paper will not describe PPP projects in detail.  For further discussion of PPP and 
the nature of the project structures often encountered in such projects, see Delmon, 
Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project Finance, PPP Projects and Risk 
(2009).  9
no clear agreement on what these terms mean.  Each term can be used for a number 
of different structures.  These different terms become even more confusing across 
national and regional divides, and as between different sectors.   
The lack of clear terminology has limited the development of PPP, and has made 
the study of PPP more complicated.  It makes comparing structures (in particular in 
different countries and sectors) more difficult, as similar structures often use 
different terminology, while dissimilar projects may use similar terminology. By 
creating a common terminology, more work can be done adopting the lessons 
Box 1: The Mighty Concession 
The term “concession” is used globally for a number of different purposes.  
At its most basic, the term means the grant by a government of a right to 
provide a service or to use an asset, for example the grant of the right to 
exploit natural resources located on or under a particular plot of land. It is 
also used to refer to different PPP structures. In Russia, a “concession” is a 
federal government structure whereby the project company builds a facility, 
transfers it to the grantor and operates it over a long period.  In France, also 
defined by law, it means giving a private entity the right to use government 
owned assets for their maintenance, operation and management over a period.  
The French model does not usually involve a significant investment 
obligation of the concessionaire. In Brazil, a managed concession is one 
where the concessionaire runs public assets and earns its revenues from 
tariffs charged to consumers, while a sponsored concession includes a 
payment by the grantor to top up the revenue stream. In Chile the concession 
is used for refurbishing and building toll roads and for the privatization of the 
water sector. The water concessions in Manila involved the transfer of 
existing assets to the project company, as well as a large amount of existing 
debt, with the project company responsible for operation, maintenance and 
expansion of the system and delivery of services to consumers. And, of 
course, in the extractive industries (e.g. oil, gas and mining) it means having 
the right of extraction in a given area, usually against a royalty paid to the 
government. The word "concession" is the most common and probably the 
least precise of the PPP terminology.  10
learned from one sector or region to projects of a similar design in another sector 
or region. It will also simplify dialogue between policymakers and practitioners, 
allowing them to express ideas and complex structures in simple, common 
terminology. 
This paper proposes a methodology for classifying the different design options for 
PPP based on their most salient elements, those characteristics fundamental to the 
nature of PPP and therefore the character of the project in question.  It also 
discusses in further detail why some of these characteristics are so important, and 
why other characteristics commonly thought to be essential to PPP have not been 
used. 
The paper is organized as follows: this section 1 introduces the need for 
categorization and describes the model.  Sections 2-6 provide a more detailed 
discussion of each of the key elements of the model: 
  New or existing business (section 2) 
  Construction obligations (section 3) 
Box 2 
For ease of reference: 
  The entity that undertakes the delivery of infrastructure services can 
take a number of forms and goes by different names, such as project 
company, concessionaire, déléguée, asset holding company, utility, 
or operator.  This paper will use the term “project company”.   
  The entity that lets, creates or grants the project may be a local 
utility, a state owned enterprise (SOE), a government department, a 
private asset owner or some other form of interested party.  In this 
paper, it will be called the “grantor” without limiting its scope to a 
public or private grantor.  
  Of the generic terms for private sector involvement in infrastructure, 
this note will use the one that carries the least political and 
psychological baggage, the least contentious and the most generic: 
PPP.    11
  Private financing (section 4) 
  Service delivery (section 5) 
  Source of revenues (section 6). 
A seventh section shows how the model would be applied to a series of case 
studies. 
1.1  CONSTRAINTS OF CURRENT MODELS 
The lack of understanding amongst those implementing PPP and those external to 
the PPP process endeavoring to assess whether PPP is a good thing is exacerbated 
by the use of terms of art that are at best inexact.  Even the French terms like 
“concession” and “affermage” defined over the centuries by French administrative 
law have lost their strict meaning outside of France.   
Generic terms for private sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure 
services, such as PFI, private concession, privatization and PSP can have 
complicated and unhelpful connotations.  “PFI” tends to mean a specific UK 
model, “private concession” is confused with the English, French and a variety of 
Latin American models of concessions.  Significant PPP projects have been 
delayed by debates over whether a “concession” or a “lease” or a “management 
contract” should be used.  These debates often become matters of institutional 
philosophy or pride, yet their meaning is rarely unpacked and is often 
misunderstood.  Often both sides of the debate intend the same result, but use 
different labels.  The misuse of the term "privatization" and the difficulty in 
analyzing its relative advantages and disadvantages suffers from many of the same 
challenges.   
A number of efforts have been made to order PPP. For example, in different books 
and articles this author used a field, with points plotted on it trying to indicate how 
different PPP structures might fit in the context of responsibility for service 
provision and control of assets. While the implication was that PPP is ultimately 
flexible, evidenced by the use of a field, the implication is still that the relevant 
terminology actually means something specific. (See Box 3). 
  12









The terms in the diagram above are some of those frequently used in PPP: 
  Management or operation and maintenance (O&M) contract – where a private 
entity provides some operation and maintenance services for a fee, usually 
based on delivering satisfactory services.   
  Affermage – where a private entity builds and/or refurbishes and operates a 
service usually delivered directly to consumers, and the grantor finances any 
major capital expenditure.  The private entity generally collects tariffs directly 
from consumers. 
  Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Design-
Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF) – where a private entity finances and 
builds/refurbishes a facility that provides services to a single or small group of 
large offtakers (often a public utility) or directly to consumers (e.g. toll roads). 
  Lease – where existing assets and/or land is leased to a private entity for 
construction of assets to provide services to offtakers or directly to consumers. 
  Concession - where a private entity finances and builds and operates a service 
usually delivered directly to consumers.  Divestiture is where the assets are 
sold to a private entity, who provides services directly to consumers. 
Control of Assets 
BOT, BOOT, 
DBFO, DCMF, 






















































Public Mixed Private 13
Another popular approach is to plot the forms of PPP against a continuum (see 
Figure 1) - this model is used for the World Bank’s PPP Resource Center Website
6, 
the UNCITRAL model law
7, PPIAF PPP toolkits
8 and others. Similar to the field 
discussed above, the continuum endeavors to show the flexibility of PPP, and the 
lack of clear delineation between different forms of PPP, by demonstrating the 
movement of PPP structures across the continuum. However, it clearly provides 
only very rough classification against the general concepts of private sector risk 
and control. It also implies that the sub-parts of the continuum are subject to clear 
and exact definition. 
Each of the existing structures endeavors to capture the flexibility of PPP while 
providing the order and structure, despite the lack of clarity. While good 
pedagogical tools, these tables are not useful for analytical purposes, and would not 
achieve the aims set out above. 
The creation of a practical, descriptive terminology will help 
i)  Reinvest PPP with the innovative and creative capacity that it is 
meant to embody 
ii)  Facilitate analysis and comparison across sectors and regions, 
permitting lessons learned to cross these often confusing barriers 
iii)  Decouple terms of art from specific examples whose specificity may 
influence assessment of other similarly named but fundamentally 
different structures. 
This paper proposes a categorization model, i) a snap shot of the most important 
characteristics of a PPP project, while ii) maintaining the simplicity necessary for it 
to function effectively.  These twin functions necessitate including only the 
absolutely critical characteristics of PPP in the model. 
                                                 
6     www.worldbank.org/inflaw 
7    www.uncitral.org 
8    www.ppiaf.org  14
  
Figure 1 
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1.2  PURPOSE OF THE CLASSIFICATION MODEL 
There is no universal norm for the most appropriate approach to PPP. While a 
variety of successful projects can be used to demonstrate elements of PPP that may 
potentially add value, it is not possible to say that one structure or model is 
necessarily more universally appropriate than another. While much time has been 
spent debating the relative merits of different models, particularly those developed 
by national bodies or historically through specific legal systems, at the end of the 
day nationalism should bend to commercial and political practicality when 
designing an appropriate PPP structure. In fact, rather than identifying one specific 
approach to emulate, designers of PPP projects need to consider advantages offered 
by numerous projects and approaches. The analysis of what is needed for a 
particular project or program needs to be made on a country-by-country, sector-by-
sector and project-by-project basis.  
The model is therefore not meant to be normative, i.e. it does not identify which 
PPP option would be the most appropriate, most efficient or most effective in any 
given situation. It does not specify what should be, its task is to report on the nature 
of a given PPP structure and its key characteristics. The model serves two key 
purposes. It: 
  Facilitates the task of practitioners when seeking to identify relevant 
lessons learned from other projects, sectors, countries, legal systems and 
cultures 
  Enables the description of a given PPP structure without the confusion 
associated with political, nationalistic or cultural labels applied to such 
structures. 
For example, when technical experts need to discuss PPP options with 
policymakers, using this classification model will facilitate the process by avoiding 
misunderstandings associated with tired or misused vocabulary. Policymakers need 
a mechanism to compare solutions easily and clearly. The current complexity and 
confusion of terminology does not help. The classification model allows 
policymakers to break projects down into their key constituent elements and to 
compare and contrast such models. It is also a pedagogical tool. By breaking 
projects down into their key characteristics, it will be easier to explain the 
importance of these characteristics and how they influence the nature of the 
project.  16
Equally, when designing PPP structures to fit the needs of a given country, sector 
or project, the design team will want to take advantage of the lessons learned from 
similar exercises and experiences. The model will help the applications of lessons 
learned from other similar structures across the globe by identifying commonalities 
amongst those structures and enabling the design team to utilize global good 
practice.  
This exercise, of course, comes with a serious caveat. Delivering infrastructure 
services is hard to get right, whether they are delivered by the public sector or 
through PPP. Even where the classification model shows commonalities between 
structures used in different places in different contexts, the design team needs to be 
very clear that the context of those projects can have a significant influence on the 
efficiency of a given PPP structure. It is never enough to simply copy things that 
have been done successfully in other places; a well-designed PPP project is 
specifically contextual. 
1.3  NATURE OF CLASSIFICATION MODEL 
A new classification model will need to focus on the most important issues in PPP 
projects: existing business risks, construction obligations, the need to arrange 
private financing, to whom the services are delivered and source of the project 
revenue stream; while avoiding the sometimes popular, but less important, issues.  
By focusing on these key issues, the classification model permits a comparison of 
projects across regions and sectors by identifying their key characteristics and 
classifying them accordingly.  It allows the communication of these key issues in a 
coordinated manner, facilitating analysis, and comparing and contrasting different 
PPP models.  The name given to a project thereby communicates a wealth of key 
information.  This represents a significant change from the current terminology 
which, by using a limited number of terms interchangeably, creates confusion.   
The classification model (Figure 2) has been kept as simple as possible to facilitate 
its use.  While not exhaustive, it identifies the key PPP issues, providing a platform 
for more in-depth analysis and in particular comparison of similar structures in 
different sectors or regions where terminology might otherwise hinder such 
assessment.    17






































The classification model addresses five key parameters that may or may not be 
relevant to any given PPP project.  These parameters identify the most fundamental 
characteristics of a PPP project. These issues are discussed in more detail in 
sections 2-6 below. 
New or existing business  
Where PPP involves the project company taking over an existing business 
(“Existing”), a number of additional risks arise (e.g. existing liabilities) as well as a 
number of benefits (e.g. existing revenue stream).  Existing business means 
employees, contracts, undertakings, commitments and other issues requiring due 
diligence by prospective investors, and more complexity in the preparations 
required from the Government.  A new business (“New”) will be easier for project 
finance lenders to ring-fence with security rights and other control mechanisms.  
But an existing business, while hard to ring fence, offers an existing revenue 
stream, tested cost data, historical demand data and other useful evidence of  18
viability and sustainability, which might allow lenders to treat the project as a 
hybrid acquisition financing and project financing. 
Construction commitments 
This part of the classification model asks whether the project company’s 
obligations include significant new capital investment and/or refurbishment of 
existing assets in the early stages of the project, in particular where consideration 
of such construction obligations form a key aspect of a potential investor’s 
assessment of the project.  A new build obligation ("Build") will differ significantly 
in complexity and risk profile from construction involving existing facilities 
("Refurbish").  The responsibility for procurement and management of major 
construction, in particular in the early phases of the project where the project 
revenue stream depends on the timely and successful completion of such capital 
expenditure, is a key driver of the risk profile for an infrastructure project. These 
construction obligations create a different risk profile for the project company, 
including managing construction contractors, increased cost risk and coordinating 
funding for such investment.  The revenue profile of the project will often change 
significantly after completion of construction, making completion risk key to the 
financial viability of the project.  
Source of private financing  
The project company may be required to provide significant financing at the outset 
of the project ("Finance"), for example for investment in assets, refinancing 
existing debt or paying a purchase price. Requiring the project company to have 
significant financial exposure to the project can help reinforce the project 
company’s incentives, if properly structured, but will certainly alter the risk 
allocation of the project as lenders and equity investors impose their requirements 
on the project company. Finance obligations tend to extend the time for 
procurement in order to allow more robust risk assessment and allocation and for 
lenders to perform due diligence.  19
Service delivery 
Where the project company delivers its services directly to consumers ("User"), its 
relationship with those consumers can raise specific complexities associated with 
the diversity of that customer base, the differing demands made by customers, the 
involvement of regulatory agencies designed to protect consumers, public and 
natural resources. On the other hand, the project company may be required to 
deliver services in bulk to a single utility ("Bulk"), in which case the interfaces 
between the project company and its client are easier to define and manage. The 
nature of the service delivery obligation is associated with specific risks, for 
example customer service functions, regulatory interfaces, financial management 
and accounting. 
Source of revenue stream  
The source of the revenue stream (from consumers or from a limited number of 
large offtakers) influences the certainty, size and nature of that revenue stream, e.g. 
the risk of collecting revenues from users and the likelihood that the obligor will be 
available to pay on its obligations.  “Fee” refers to a single or small number of 
purchasers of the offtake or service, while “Tariffs” refers to collection of revenues 
from a large number of consumers or users.  The source of revenues will therefore 
specifically alter the mechanisms that the project company will need to implement 
to manage that risk, for example billing functions and collection methodologies. 
He will also have a critical influence on the credit enhancement and security rights 
that investors and financiers may require, for example where collection risk for the 
privatization of the obligor of the revenues is insufficient, the need for a score 
arrangements for the credit enhancement may arise. 
The service delivery and revenue source columns could in theory be combined. 
They both relate to the relationship between the project company and individual 
consumers. However, often the financial and service delivery relationships are 
different, for example a home-based road (User-Tariff) and unavailability fee-
based road (the User-Fee), these are very different structures that can be clearly 
differentiated by using separate columns for service delivery and revenue. 
1.4  USING THE CLASSIFICATION MODEL 
A few precisions should be made on the application of the model:  20
  A project need not include each parameter; in fact many projects do not 
include each of the parameters indicated. 
  If a project satisfies more than one row in a given column, reference is 
made to the bottom row.  Therefore a toll road project involving both 
Build and Refurbish would be referred to as a Refurbish project.  This is 
because the bottom row represents the greater amount of risk allocated to 
the project company, and therefore reflects better the key issues associated 
with that parameter.  
  There is a clear level of subjectivity to the application of this model, and 
therefore its results should be considered accordingly.  For example, 
where the project company bears an obligation to finance the project, but 
the amount of financing required (beyond that available from project 
revenues) is not relatively significant, the model should not reference 
“Finance”.  This will entail a subjective assessment as to the relative 
significance of the amount of financing required from the project 
company. 
1.5  ISSUES EXCLUDED FROM THE MODEL 
The following are some of the issues that were intentionally excluded from the 
model, for the reasons set out below.  Many of these excluded issues will be 
controversial. Some of these issues are relevant, but not sufficiently critical to 
merit inclusion in the model.  In other cases, a proper treatment of the issue would 
require a level of complexity in the model that would defeat the central goal of 
simplicity. 
Hand-over 
At the end of the project period, the project assets and business need to be handed 
to the grantor or to another project company (maybe even the same project 
company).  The nature of hand-over, while it may be complex in design and 
implementation, is more important in its significance in the treatment of public 
assets and public perception of the nature of the project, in particular whether the 
project will be considered a quasi-privatization (which may raise public resistance) 
and does it satisfy public accounting rules (e.g. where return to the public sector 
might result in the project debt being counted as Government debt).  However, the 
actual impact of reversion on the risk profile of the project and the relevance of the  21
project to the government are limited.  Every PPP project involves handover of 
some sort, whether to the government or to another private company, unless the 
project involves full the vesture by the government, or where the assets have 
reached the end of their lifecycle. But even then, most projects will contemplate 
some reversion right of the government, even if it is just in the event of project 
company default. Any additional information provided by including hand-over in 
the classification model would be outweighed by the added complexity of the 
model and was therefore rejected. 
Who owns the assets? 
Transfer of asset ownership to the project company may be done for a number of 
reasons, for example to 
i)  Keep debt off balance sheet, where government ownership of assets 
might result in project debt associated with the assets being treated as 
government debt 
ii)  Allow the project company to account for depreciation and other tax 
benefits to the extent these are reserved for owners of the underlying 
property  
iii)  Provide the project company with regulatory/legal rights (e.g. for 
simplified access to third party land, disconnection of services or 
legal “standing” to challenge regulatory decisions) to the extent these 
attach only to the asset owner 
iv)  Give investors and lenders security of legal title  
However, the implications of asset ownership are relatively limited, and in fact are 
only slightly different than other rights that might be created over the assets (like 
leases and licenses).  The regulatory and accounting issues discussed above aside, 
the key concern associated with asset ownership is the enforcement of government 
reversion rights or whatever transfer arrangements there may be at the end of the 
project period.  Where the project company owns the assets, enforcing such 
transfer obligations may be more difficult unless specifically supported by law or 
the legal system.  However, most legal systems allow governments to seize assets 
used for public services, including roads, water, power and similar facilities. And 
every jurisdiction allows the government to seize private assets for reasons of  22
public or national interest. In some cases, the government will have a legal right to 
seize assets associated with important public services, in urgent cases, for example 
the UK government seized the assets of Railtrack under a similar legal right.
9 
Therefore, asset ownership is an illusory comfort. Lenders will often proclaim the 
importance of asset ownership and security for their loans, but such rights are 
rarely more effective than other security rights. Lenders will generally not be able 
to remove assets to dispose of them or sell the whole project, therefore such 
security rights are more often defensive in nature - to protect against those who 
would want to seize project assets or stop project operations. Therefore, so long as 
other creditors are junior to the lenders, and they have stepping rights to ensure that 
they can maintain project operations, asset ownership is not needed. And, in 
practice, most projects do not benefit from asset ownership. 
Scope of work 
The exact nature of the services to be provided by the project company 
differentiates projects and provides specific understanding of the commercial and 
technical risks likely to be encountered by the project company.  For example, two 
different PPP projects may allocate to the project company the task of managing 
power distribution in a given area.  However, one PPP allocates all management 
functions while the other relates only to billing and collection.  It would be 
possible to devise a model that would differentiate even the most subtle differences 
in scope of work; however, such a model would be too complex to be useful.  For 
this reason, the detail of the scope of work demanded of the project company is not 
included in this model. 
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Design risk 
PPP projects will allocate very different levels of design risk to the project 
company, whether the project company provides the preliminary design, the 
detailed design and/or the working drawings, in particular the extent to which the 
project company warrants the design, the site data and concept that underlies the 
design.  The project company may also take the risk of obtaining approvals for the 
design and its different elements.  While design risk is an important measure for an 
investor considering a PPP project, it is not as useful when comparing projects 
across sectors and regions, would complicate the model significantly given the 
many different variations of design risk that may be taken by the project company. 
Ongoing asset renewal/maintenance 
The model addresses investment in new assets or significant, predefined 
refurbishment of existing assets in the early stages of the project, but it does not 
address on-going asset maintenance or replacement.  This is typically a project 
company risk where the project company provides asset management functions.  
While this risk is an important aspect of a PPP project, it was considered so 
common that it was not included as a separate category to avoid diluting its 
relevance.  Providing a separate category for this function was considered 
insufficiently critical when balanced against its complexity and the underlying 
pursuit of simplicity. 
Access to grants/subsidies 
The grantor or some government entity may provide funding such as subsidies, 
financing, and/or investment.  While government money is clearly an important 
part of any project, this model focuses instead on the risks and obligations placed 
on the project company, with the clear implication that all other risks and 
obligations will be borne by the grantor.  For this reason, the model focuses on 
private financing mobilized by the project company. 
 
2.  Business 
The project company will take responsibility for an existing business (“Existing”) 
or a new, greenfield function (“New”). A project involving the creation of a new  24
water treatment facility to provide bulk water to the water utility would be a New 
project, while the extension and operation of an existing airport would be an 
Existing project. 
Projects which involve an existing business can be more complex to implement, 
requiring assessment of risks associated with, for example, existing assets, 
employees and business liabilities. Each of these issues will necessitate a more 
extensive due diligence process than would a New project. However, an Existing 
business can also bring with it a better understanding of demand, an existing 
portfolio of assets and business, more certainty as to project data (since it will have 
been tested) and an existing revenue stream; all of which can make for a significant 
benefit for investors and the financial viability of the project. 
2.1  NEW  
In the case of a New project, the investors need not perform significant due 
diligence on what went before. Risks, in particular liabilities, can be considered on 
a prospective basis, ring fencing the investors, and in particular the lenders. It is 
also easier to replicate New project structures in different places, for example the 
successful IPP and toll road programs that have been developed in Chile and other 
countries. The key benefits of a New PPP include: 
  Defined capex - the single purpose nature of a New PPP project allows the 
investors and lenders alike to identify with some accuracy the total debt 
and equity requirements of the project.  The design of solutions can start 
from the more or less blank page, without the complication and 
uncertainty of the series of interactions and relationships typical of 
existing commercial functions. Though there may be some slippage in 
construction cost, the capital expenditure required for the project is 
defined in advance, and therefore allows greater certainty and 
foreseeability. 
  Ring-fenced operation – since they involve a new legal entity and a new 
commercial undertaking, New projects provide a more straightforward 
opportunity for project assessment, due diligence, security rights, risk 
assessment, forecast of financial viability, isolation of the revenue stream. 
Investors and lenders need not be concerned with historical liabilities, 
rights created in third parties, defects caused by third parties, etc.   25
  Isolated services - utilities are often loathe (or may find it unwieldy) to 
outsource management or decision-making processes, but are more 
comfortable isolating specific tasks for private sector involvement.  Since 
New PPP usually involves identified structures or services, this may fit 
more easily into the context of utility management.   
2.2  EXISTING  
Existing projects involve a project company taking over an existing task or 
function and possibly refurbishing or expanding them.  It may relate to a whole 
task or whole business structure, outsourcing to the private sector the delivery of 
services needed to perform that task or manage the business.   
Existing projects can involve the following:  
  Reallocation of management functions  
  Outsourcing and repackaging of services  
  Reform of recruitment policy and incentive structures  
  Improving customer relations 
  Reforming corporate objectives.  
The projects therefore have the ability to improve corporate and management 
capacity. This also allows the government to isolate cost centers within the 
corporate and management structures, thereby  
  Identifying inefficiencies  
  Allowing the measurement of outputs per unit of subsidy provided  
  Enabling the government to reform the way it gives subsidies and 
incentives to management in the context of infrastructure service delivery.   
The clear benefit of PPP in Existing projects is to encourage reform of 
infrastructure service delivery at the most fundamental levels.  Infrastructure 
service delivery is primarily in need of improved management (financial, technical  26
and labor),
10 this implies greater use of Existing projects. Some of the most 
common services allocated through Existing projects include: 
  Management of distribution systems/assets - using performance-based 
incentive mechanisms to achieve greater efficiency in the management 
and replacement of assets, responding to end-user complaints, requests for 
new connections and other asset related services. 
  Exploitation of commercial opportunities – certain assets, like airports and 
toll roads,  present opportunities for affiliated commercial undertakings, 
e.g. using available land, excess asset capacity, or selling additional goods 
and services to end-users.  This is of particular interest in airports and 
ports where a number of commercial services can be sold using the 
property available for the project. 
  Billing and collection - public service providers are often inefficient when 
collecting tariffs from end-users due to a lack of incentives created for the 
public utility to improve its revenue stream and the potential political 
ramifications.  By outsourcing billing and collection, collection risk can 
be allocated to the private sector as can enforcement penalties, 
disconnection, etc. The incentive mechanisms for such arrangements need 
to be developed carefully to avoid overly vigorous application of police 
powers and the health and safety ramifications of overly aggressive 
collection methods leading to unnecessary disconnections or excessive 
(and possibly unhealthy) usage reduction. 
  Reduction of operating costs – the project company, in its pursuit of 
profitability, is generally more experienced at maximizing efficiency than 
are public utilities.  By providing the project company with properly 
balanced incentives, the grantor can benefit from greater efficiency. 
  Customer service - private sector commercial entities are often more 
focused on customer service, in order to improve profitability and attract a 
greater customer base.  By outsourcing such customer services, public 
utilities can benefit from the greater experience of the private sector. 
                                                 
10   Gassner, Popov and Pushak, “Does the Private Sector Deliver on its Promises? 
Evidence from a global study in water and electricity distribution”, (World Bank, 
December 2007). www.ppiafdev.org.  27
This Existing model raises a number of complications not encountered in New 
projects, for example  
  Social risk - Existing projects involve a more extensive interface between 
the private sector and the general public.  Since infrastructure services are 
often historically provided by public entities, the difference in approach to 
service delivery and customer relations between private and public sector 
entity may result in considerable backlash from consumers.
11   
  Existing activities - Consideration may need to be given to the transfer of 
public sector employees, existing liabilities, unidentified liabilities and 
contractual or other obligations which may constrain the project 
company's activities in the future.  Existing projects are vulnerable to the 
implications of current and past activities. 
  Existing assets - Existing assets may not be identified and categorized in 
advance.  Further, the condition of those assets and need for replacement 
or refurbishment may not be clear until well into the project. The potential 
for any defects or shortcomings in these assets creates a significant risk 
for all parties. 
  Future expansion - Rather than being bound to a strict scope of works to 
be built or improvements to be made, the project company may be bound 
to more general obligations to improve the quality of services delivered, 
e.g. the level of losses from the distribution system or the quality of 
services rendered to consumers.  The need for capital expenditure may not 
be clear at commencement of the project.  This may necessitate the project 
company agreeing with the grantor on rolling programs for capital 
investment based on the amount of income obtained by the project 
company or as required to satisfy the performance criteria placed on the 
project company.   
  Customer services – The project company will need to comply with public 
and social obligations associated with the delivery of infrastructure 
services.  Where the regulator is technically competent and genuinely 
                                                 
11   Delmon, “Implementing Social Policy into Contracts for the Provision of Utility 
Services”, in Dani, Kessler and Sclar eds., Making Connections: Putting Social Policy 
at the Heart of Infrastructure Development (2007).  28
independent from the political establishment, the regulator may provide a 
practical buffer for the project company against interference from 
government bodies.  In the absence of an adequate regulatory framework, 
a specific regime will need to be included in the project agreements, and 
may be reinforced by government shareholding in the project company. 
 
3.  Construction obligation 
The second key characteristic of a PPP project is the allocation of a major 
construction obligation, focused on either Build (obligation to construct capital 
assets – also known as a greenfield project) or Refurbish (a significant obligation to 
refurbish or expand existing assets – also known as a brownfield project).  So a 
greenfield power plant would be a Build PPP while the refurbishment of an 
existing hospital would be a Refurbish PPP.   
These construction obligations are limited to significant undertakings occurring 
early in the project, such that prospective investors will plan and possibly prepare 
preliminary designs for such works in advance and will consider carefully such 
works as a part of project assessment. Such construction obligations would 
therefore have a more considerable impact on the risk allocation set out in project 
agreements and risk perceptions of potential investors. The more a capital 
expenditure obligation is delayed in time after commencement of project, the more 
uncertain will be the nature of that obligation, and the less specific will be its 
implications to an investor evaluating the potential of a project.  Where the 
obligation does not arise until some time after commencement, it may not be 
feasible to enter into a fixed price / fixed time construction contract.  The model 
therefore highlights the difference in risk profile of projects that involve a 
significant construction obligation in the early part of the project. 
The financing for the project will assume a date for completion of the works.  Any 
failure to complete the works by this date will have a direct impact on the 
sufficiency of revenues to repay debt and accumulate return on equity.  Given the 
generally fixed duration of a PPP project, every day of delay reduces total revenues 
for the project.  Similarly any increase in cost of the works will have a direct 
impact on the extent to which revenues are sufficient to satisfy debt repayment and 
to earn a profit for the equity holders.  Therefore a project company undertaking a 
significant capital expenditure obligation will be subject to market risk  29
implications, such as the market cost of labor, materials, and technology. 
Underperforming works reduce revenues (which are generally output based) and 
therefore undermine financial viability of the project. 
But undertaking major construction works also represents a significant commercial 
opportunity from the construction and associated contracts. The profit margins on 
turnkey, also known as engineer -- procure -- construct (EPC), contracts are usually 
significantly higher than the profit margin items earned by contractors on 
traditional construction contracts. Bidding consortia for a project involving a 
significant construction obligation are often led by construction contractors 
interested primarily in winning the construction contract. This raises conflict of 
interest and control issues for the grantor, shareholders and the lenders. 
3.1  CONSTRUCTION RISK 
The construction phase involves potentially the most costly project risk.  The 
nature of PPP projects is such that an incomplete project will be of limited value.  
Therefore, both the grantor and the lenders will have a significant interest in 
ensuring that the works are completed in accordance with the project 
specifications.  Construction risk includes:  
   The adequacy of the design of the works 
  The nature of the technology to be used and the risk of defects in 
equipment or materials 
  Unforeseen events or conditions, such as extreme weather or unforeseen 
subsurface conditions 
  Environmental risks arising during construction 
  The availability of labor and materials, whether skilled labor can be 
procured locally, to what extent both labor and materials will need to be 
imported, visas and licenses for such importation and restrictions imposed 
by local labor laws (including working hours and holiday entitlement) 
  The availability of experienced management, committed to the project  30
  The availability of associated infrastructure and services, such as access 
roads, the provision of services to the site (including water, electricity and 
other utilities) and transportation to the site for labor and materials 
  The program for completion, whether the time for completion is realistic 
in view of the labor and materials required for the project, the technology 
in question, the limitations of the host country infrastructure, climate and 
market, design requirements, and testing and commissioning 
  The cost of completion, changes in the market for labor and materials, 
services necessary for construction, financing costs, administrative costs 
and other costs subject to change over the period of the construction 
contract 
  Political and natural force majeure. 
The project company may want to impose a fitness for purpose standard on the 
construction contractor.  A fitness for purpose obligation will help maintain the 
fixed price, by placing on the construction contractor the obligation to ensure the 
design is sufficient for the purpose intended for the project, and therefore decrease 
the need for variations in the scope of works.  
The construction contractor will be responsible for designing and building a project 
capable of performing in accordance with the specified standards.  After the 
construction contractor has finished construction of the project, it must satisfy 
certain tests and inspections in order to demonstrate compliance with the project 
specifications, successful connections with any external network (such as a power 
grid or a water system), and proper management of interfaces between different 
equipment and technologies used in the project.  This commissioning process will 
often involve a performance component to ensure that minimum levels of 
performance are achieved before taking over by the project company.   
The time for completion will be of great importance for the project company and 
the grantor.  The project company will want to commence operation of the project 
as soon as possible in order to earn maximum revenue and improve return on 
investment.  The grantor will have put the project out to tender owing to a pressing 
need for the service to be rendered and will therefore want the construction 
completed in the least possible time.  The government may have given political  31
undertakings to complete the project within a specific time frame or before the next 
election.  
Cost increase risk will also arise as between financial close and from time to time 
throughout project implementation.  This risk is also generally shared between the 
grantor and the project company, but with the grantor taking a markedly smaller 
portion of this risk.  Certain of the elements of post-financial close cost increase 
risk are discussed below.  Change in law and other similar events which can 
increase the project cost will be discussed later. 
Given the time frames involved in PPP projects and the construction period, costs 
specific to construction, such as the cost of labour and materials, are likely to 
change.  The project company and the lenders will want the construction contract 
to be let for a fixed price with extremely limited opportunities for the construction 
contractor to increase the contract price.   
3.2  BUILD 
A greenfield project, where new assets are built, a Build classification, implies 
significant project company risk, associated with design risk, permitting, 
construction cost and time for completion.  The project company will need to 
invest significant efforts into a Build facility, often with little information on site 
conditions, how the chosen technology will work on the site and how different 
construction methodologies will work given the context of the site. Build projects 
will therefore raise a number of specific issues: 
  Site conditions risk – A Build obligation often involves a greenfield site, 
one where complex works or structures have not existed before.  The site 
would therefore involve little if any risk of existing structures, but equally 
there may be limited information on the nature of the site, in particular 
subsurface and hydrological conditions.  What information there is may 
not be proven and may therefore involve the risk of inaccuracy or 
incompleteness. This raises specific concerns for project companies and 
potential investors, who may need to perform surveys and studies in 
advance of making an investment decision to assess this risk. 
  Design flexibility – A Build scenario often involves a high degree of 
flexibility for the project company to adopt the technology most 
appropriate to the services to be performed, with the opportunity for  32
private sector innovation and efficiencies.  The challenge is encouraging 
such innovation while maintaining on the project company the risk of 
performance of the works.   
  Certainty of time and cost – a greenfield project, with limited interface 
with other works, flexibility in design and a well defined scope of works, 
as is often the case for Build projects, makes it easier for the project 
company to enter into a fixed price and time construction contract (also 
known as an engineer-procure-construct (EPC) or turnkey contract).  This 
will then facilitate the grantor placing more strict obligations on the 
grantor to deliver the works to a fixed price and by a fixed date. 
 
3.3  REFURBISH 
The Refurbish obligation involves refurbishment or expansion of existing assets. 
These existing assets may have been recently built another contractor or may have 
been in place for some time. Refurbish involves similar risks to the Build 
obligations, while the presence of existing assets raises a number of additional 
risks associated with  
  The condition of existing assets - their lifecycle, appropriateness for the 
intended purpose and for the refurbishment or expansion works planned.  
There may not be an up to date asset register or any other record of the 
condition of those assets, and therefore tis risk can be difficult to manage. 
  Any latent defects that may exist in the existing assets– even where the 
assets have been well maintained, defects may exist from their 
manufacture or construction. With existing works, it is often difficult to 
identify such defects, or to confirm the quality of existing construction.  
Also, the construction contractor for those works is unlikely to make 
available warranties as to the quality of the works unless such warranties 
are obtained in advance of the work they perform.  
  Design of the existing assets and interfaces with the refurbishment, since 
the new works must interface with the design of the existing works, the 
materials used, the technology adopted, etc.  The design of the existing 
works may limit the design options for the refurbishment of those works,  33
limiting the technology that can be adopted, the construction 
methodologies that can be followed and the materials that can be used. 
  Permits or regulations applicable specifically to the existing works, that 
would limit the use, change in use or refurbishment of those existing 
assets. 
  Existing site and environmental conditions, often associated with the 
construction or use of existing works, for example the presence of 
asbestos, or the disposal on the site of chemical waste. 
  The appropriateness of those existing assets for the works to be built, for 
example do the existing works fit with the technical solution or design of 
the new works such that the completed, refurbished works will perform in 
accordance with applicable specification. 
In general, a Refurbish project raises the risk that the nature of the existing 
assets will cause a delay, increased cost of or reduce the performance of new 
works.  The project company will generally have limited time or opportunity 
to review existing works and is likely to have limited information on the 
existing works, their conditions and any existing defects. 
 
4.  Private funding  
A project is Finance when the project company must provide a material amount of 
private financing in the early stages of the project, that cannot be addressed using 
available project revenues, for example: 
  Predefined, upfront financing of construction obligations, equipment or 
supplies 
  Investment needed to address operating losses until the revenue stream 
can be improved or costs reduced 
  A purchase price for the project, land or other essential assets, paid to the 
grantor or anyone else  34
  An obligation to refinance existing debt. 
Therefore, Finance would not include normal funding facilities associated with the 
project company’s business, for example working capital facilities, or lines of 
credit to be sourced at some point in the future but with no firm undertaking by 
lenders (e.g. financial close) in the beginning of the project. 
Risks associated with a Finance obligation relate primarily to the availability of 
funding, cost of funding, the cost and time associated with arranging funding and 
the risk that the project will not be able to satisfy debt service obligations. Lenders 
will have their own requirements for the project, the security rights they will seek 
and any undertakings required from the grantor and shareholders. 
The risks associated with Finance will depend partly on the nature of the funders 
(debt and equity) and its influence on the project.  Each funder (whether domestic 
or foreign; private, public or institutional; bank or non-bank) will have its own 
particular requirements, interests, concerns and strengths. Integral to the provision 
of debt to the project company is the need for the project company to give up 
control of its assets, finances and even operations to the lenders, who will want to 
keep control of certain of these key decisions, and of the monies available to the 
project company.   
The classification methodology uses the term Finance to include both debt and 
equity funding. 
4.1  SOURCES OF FINANCING 
A PPP project will involve financing from various sources, in some combination of 
equity and debt.  
Equity contributions 
Equity contributions are funds invested in the project company which comprise its 
share capital and other shareholder funds.  Equity holds the lowest priority of the 
contributions, e.g. debt contributors will have the right to project assets and 
revenues before the equity contributors can obtain any return; or, on termination or 
insolvency, any repayment, and equity shareholders cannot normally receive 
distributions unless the company is in profit.  Equity contributions bear the highest 
risk and therefore potentially receive the highest returns.    35
Debt contributions 
Debt can be obtained from many sources, including commercial lenders, export 
credit agencies, bilateral or multilateral organisations, bondholders (such as 
institutional investors) and sometimes the host country government. The source of 
debt will have an important influence on the nature of the debt provided. Unlike 
equity contributions, debt contributions have the highest priority amongst the 
invested funds (e.g. senior debt must be serviced before any other payments are 
made). PPP generally involves the construction of high value, long life assets with 
stable revenues, and therefore seeks long-term, fixed interest debt.  
Mezzanine/subordinated contributions 
Located somewhere between equity and debt, mezzanine contributions are 
accorded lower priority than senior debt but higher priority than equity.  Examples 
of mezzanine contributions are subordinated loans and preference shares.   
Subordinated loans involve a lender agreeing not to be paid until more “senior” 
lenders to the same borrower have been paid, whether in relation to specific project 
revenues or in the event of insolvency.  Preference shares are equity shares, but 
with priority over other “common” shares when it comes to distributions.   
Mezzanine contributors will be compensated for the added risk they take either by 
receiving higher interest rates on loans than the senior debt contributors and/or by 
participating in the project profits or the capital gains achieved by project equity.   
Project Finance 
One of the most common, and often most efficient, financing arrangements for PPP 
projects is “project financing”, also known as “limited recourse” or “non-recourse” 
financing. Project financing normally takes the form of limited recourse lending to 
a specially created project vehicle which has the right to carry out the construction 
and operation of the project.  Limited recourse means that the lenders look only to 
the assets and revenues of the project for repayment of debt and interest; and not to 
the shareholders. One of the primary advantages of project financing is that it can 
provide off-balance sheet financing, which will not affect the credit of the 
shareholders or the grantor, and shifts some of the project risk to the lenders in 
exchange for which the lenders obtain a higher margin than for normal corporate 
lending.  This motivates the lenders to require a detailed assessment of risk 
management and allocation before financing is committed to the project.  Thus 
major project challenges are identified and addressed early in the project.  Normal  36
public procurement does not achieve this, leaving risks to be discovered later, often 
when it is too late, or far more costly to address.  
4.2  LENDING 
The profile of a lender group can range from project to project, and may include a 
combination of private sector commercial lenders together with export credit 
agencies, and bilateral and multilateral finance organizations.  These international, 
often political, entities are frequently involved in PPP projects and can have an 
important impact on the risk allocation and financing used in a project.  When 
involved in such projects, these agencies will place strict requirements on the 
project structure and lending arrangements, in particular in relation to 
environmental and social safeguards).  Lenders anxious to benefit from such 
involvement (and the potential mitigation of political risk) will make it a priority to 
ensure that these requirements are satisfied. 
Funding is sometimes provided by project bonds, sold on the capital markets, or by 
sovereign wealth funds and other financial intermediaries.  As a general premise, 
the lenders will only want to take those risks which are measurable and measured. 
The lenders will not be in the operation, construction or insurance business and 
therefore will not want to bear risks with which they are unfamiliar and which are 
more appropriately borne by other parties.  Nevertheless, the lenders will be 
involved in most of the important phases of the works, including the financial 
structuring, the drafting of the project documents and certification of completion.  
They will generally maintain their review powers over the project with the 
assistance of an independent engineer (a specialist technical adviser who monitors 
construction and approves completion of milestones, amongst other things).  The 
lenders may require that direct agreements be entered into between themselves and 
each of the project participants.
12 
The terms and conditions that lenders will be willing to give for a specific project 
will depend primarily on the nature of the borrower, in particular the borrowers 
credit position and the nature of any other security, credit enhancement or support 
the project may have. However, the nature of the lender will have a lot to do with 
the terms and conditions offered. For example, 
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  The conditionalities applied to any loan will depend very much on the 
goals of the lender.  Commercial lenders will apply conditionality focused 
on improving revenues, managing costs and protecting the lender’s 
cushion.  Lenders whose focus is national interests, for example 
encouraging exports such as export credit agencies, will focus more on the 
nationality of contractors and suppliers and their interests. Finally, lenders 
whose reason for being is tied to development will be concerned more 
with sector reform, economic growth and poverty reduction. 
  Bankability requirements and lender appetite will depend on the nature of 
the lender, their existing loan portfolio, their strategy for portfolio 
development and their desire to enter into new markets.  Lenders will 
react to political risk in different ways, those familiar with the country or 
a region may approach the risk in a less risk-averse manner than others.  
Lenders with a bilateral or multilateral origin may have better 
relationships with the relevant government, and will therefore view 
political risk in a different way. 
  Price and fees will clear he clearly very based on market practice and on 
the nature of the lender in question. Similarly, some lenders will be more 
efficient than others, and therefore the cost to the borrower of managing 
lender involvement and due diligence can differ significantly. For 
example, some lenders will accept common lender technical and legal 
advisors, while others will insist on having their own lawyers and 
technical team. 
  The flexibility exhibited by different lenders can vary, for example the 
ability of the borrower to renegotiate or reschedule debts terms and 
conditions.  To this extent, banks are usually more flexible than 
bondholders. 
  The complexity, sophistication of the type of debt available to borrowers 
will depend on the nature of the lender, their experience in such products 
and the depth of financial market in which the lender operates (see section 
4.4 for further discussion of this issue). 
Lenders will often not act alone, and the grouping of lenders, the relative weight of 
each lender's involvement and the role such lenders play will have a significant 
influence on the nature of the debt available. For example, some lenders act as  38
arrangers, providing the service to the borrower of interfacing with different 
lenders and helping to coordinate access to debt.  This may involve underwriting, 
according to which the lender promises to provide access to all of the debt needed.  
Lenders may choose to club together, whereby they will agree amongst a small 
group of lenders to each take a certain proportion of the project requirements. Once 
a lender has agreed to provide debt, it may choose to syndicate some or all of its 
position, by selling its debt onto the financial market to other lenders. Where 
multiple lenders are involved in a project, they will agree together on a common 
lender position on certain issues, for example management of security rights, 
which is usually formalized in an intercreditor agreement. 
4.3  EQUITY INVESTORS 
The sponsors will identify a project and put together a bid in an effort to be 
awarded the project.  This typically means the private sector investors will create a 
new company (the “project company”) – usually a limited liability special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) - which will contract with the grantor to design, construct, operate, 
maintain and transfer the project.  The use of an SPV is likely to enable the 
sponsors to finance the project on a limited recourse basis.  The grantor may 
require that the project company includes local investors in order to improve 
transfer of technology, and provide jobs and training to local personnel.  Most 
shareholders will want to be able to divest their shareholding as early as possible, 
in particular commercial/construction companies that are not accustomed to long-
term shareholding.  The grantor, on the other hand, will want the shareholders tied 
to the fortunes of the project company as long as possible, to align their interests 
more with those of the grantor (a financially viable project over the long term).  
Shareholders of the project company will often be both shareholder in the SPV and 
a contractor to the SPV.  This conflict of interest will need to be managed amongst 
the shareholders, the grantor and the lenders, for example the conflicted 
shareholder should not be in a position to negotiate or influence the negotiation of 
their contract or set prices. 
The nature of equity investors (public, private or mixed) in the project company 
will have specific relevance to the decision making within the project company, for 
example through the allocation of shareholder voting rights, right to elect board 
members, minority shareholder rights, different classes of shares, control through 
subcontracts and outsourcing. Rights, shares may be controlled through trusts or 
other vehicles, possibly to provide lenders with additional security. The  39
shareholding arrangements are often complex, including the use of multiple 
subsidiaries, cross-shareholding, etc. These structures are often developed to 
improve accounting and tax efficiency. 
The project company may also be subject to public control, for example through a 
joint stock company. This approach, while not common globally, is found in many 
developing countries.  Key challenges associated with government shareholding in 
the project company include conflicts of interest between the government as 
shareholder and the government as grantor, for example difficulties for the 
government as shareholder to agree for the project company to sue the government 
as grantor.  
 
5.  Service delivery 
The project company may be required to deliver services in bulk to a single offtake 
or ("Bulk"), or directly to consumers (“User”). Under a Bulk project, the project 
company delivers services to a utility or a single off-taker, the project company's 
obligations and the management of the service delivery is generally more 
straightforward. A Bulk project usually means that the project company is not 
responsible for customer service, mitigating social risk, the implications of social 
policy and a comprehensive intervention of a regulatory authority.  
A  User project involves a project company that delivers services directly to 
consumers, with all associated customer service, billing and collection risks. This 
involves a complex relationship with individual consumers, consumer groups, the 
local community, and political authorities associated with those consumers, in 
particular regulatory authorities. The definition of service delivery and the 
mechanisms for monitoring and managing that service delivery may need to be 
flexible in order to adapt as consumer requirements change, for example as 
demographics change. 
So, the construction and operation of a power generation facility that delivers 
electricity to the local utility would be a Bulk project; while the running of a water 
utility, delivering water to consumers would be a User project.   
It should be noted that a variety of services may fall under the User structure. A 
User project may only require the project company to take on billing and collection  40
obligations, with no real service provision to consumers.
13  Equally, a Bulk project 
places an obligation on the project company to deliver services to the grantor or an 
offtaker.  However, often, the revenue stream for a Bulk project comes from the 
grantor or offtaker, but the service is delivered to consumers (a User-Fee project).  
The credit risk of the offtaker may suffer if it is not able to collect from consumers, 
or if consumer tariffs are too low (see discussion below of revenue sources). 
5.1  BULK 
Bulk is generally less risky for investors and lenders alike. Risk assessment is 
easier in Bulk projects, where offtake or credit risk, demand history, etc. is easier to 
analyze.  Bulk delivery will involve managing the operation of the project, 
providing maintenance for and replacing materials and equipment, receiving and 
managing inputs and developing the relationship with the offtake purchaser.   
Bulk risks will include: 
  Performance risk - the proper operation and maintenance of the works to 
achieve the required levels of output or availability.  Where the works do 
not operate at the levels required, the offtake purchaser will, unless it is at 
fault, have some right to withhold payments or collect damages from the 
project company in relation to the amount of the damages incurred, or 
(subject to certain requirements) terminate the offtake purchase 
agreement.   
  Increase of cost risk - including the effects of inflation, increases in the 
market price of materials or labor or increases in the cost of other required 
services, such as insurance.   
  Operation risk - operating the project in accordance with the standards and 
performance levels set out in the concession and the offtake purchase 
agreements, including the impact of defects associated with the 
construction of the works, shortcomings in inputs (such as fuel and 
chemicals) used to produce outputs, etc.. 
  Political risk – including the risk of change in the political climate of the 
host country.  The project company’s methods of operation and its 
                                                 
13   This formulation is used in water and electricity distribution systems to help improve 
billing and collection where public utilities are often weak.    41
relationship with its employees and the local and national communities 
will be under close observation by both the local population and the host 
government to ensure that the services rendered by the operator are 
consistent with public expectations.  The project company’s services can 
have an impact on the popular perception of the grantor. 
  Commercial interfaces – the project company will need to liaise with all 
of the project participants, manage the input and output needs of the 
project, and manage the transfer of care for the project from the 
construction contractor at completion of construction and to the grantor at 
the end of the concession period.  These project participants include: 
  Operation and maintenance (O&M) contractor – the project 
company may outsource some of the operation tasks to an O&M 
contractor.  In this event, the project company will need to manage 
carefully the interfaces with this contractor to ensure proper 
performance. 
  Construction contractor – the project company will be responsible 
for delivery of services and output, therefore the performance of 
the construction contractor (whether or not hired or paid by the 
project company) will be key to fulfilling these obligations.  The 
project company will therefore want to manage carefully the 
construction contractor’s activities, and testing the completion of 
the works to avoid the need to address defects or performance 
shortfalls. 
  Offtake purchaser – the purchaser of the output or services 
provided by the project company. The offtake purchaser and the 
project company will need to maintain a constant relationship 
throughout the concession period.  They will need to develop an 
efficient mechanism to facilitate the communication to the project 
company of the offtake purchaser's needs.  The parties will then 
have to organize the delivery and receipt of the output provided, 
including inspections and testing.   
  Input supplier – the supplier of materials, equipment, spares, fuel, 
electricity and any other inputs needed to produce the services or 
outputs to be sold to the offtaker,  42
  Grantor - The grantor will have an interest in the proper operation 
and maintenance of the project, to ensure that the assets it receives 
at the end of the concession period are in an appropriate condition 
and will not require extensive replacement or repair.  Therefore, 
during operation, the grantor may wish to review to some extent 
the testing carried out, and to perform testing of its own, on the 
works to confirm the general operating condition of the project; 
although it will probably not want to be involved in the more 
detailed testing.   
5.2  USER 
The  Bulk approach does not necessarily provide the flexibility and range of 
services sought from PPP, for example where the grantor wants to improve service 
distribution in public utilities like water, power, waste collection and fixed line 
telecommunications.  For this reason, User structures have become more common, 
permitting the grantor to involve the project company in 
  Implementing modern management approaches, particularly where the 
company's historic operating methods are unnecessarily labor intensive 
and not orientated towards the needs of consumers 
  Improving distribution capacity, reducing leakages/losses, improving 
billing/collection and providing long term maintenance to ensure that the 
condition of the distribution system is consistently monitored and 
improved.   
A project company undertaking a User project will encounter certain issues which 
are not commonly encountered in Bulk projects.  The following is a discussion of a 
few of these issues. 
Future expansion 
The need for capital expenditure over the life of a User project may not be clear at 
commencement of the project.  Therefore, the project arrangements must be 
flexible to allow the project company to manage the circumstances encountered on 
site, rather than being bound to a strict scope of works to be built or improvements 
to be made.  The obligations placed on the project company will more likely reflect 
general obligations, e.g. to improve the quality of services delivered, reduce  43
losses/leakage and improve cost recover through tariffs.  This may necessitate the 
project company agreeing with the grantor on rolling programs for capital 
investment against an investment program or budget based on the amount of 
income obtained by the project company or as required to satisfy the performance 
criteria placed on the project company.  The permitted level of tariffs charged to 
consumers is also likely to have an important impact on the value and nature of 
capital works undertaken by the project company. This means that the project 
company may only be committed to mobilize financing at bid stage for the first 
works program. 
Existing assets 
The grantor will usually transfer ownership, or use, of existing assets to the project 
company (whether or not this involves a transfer of legal title) for the purpose of 
performance of its obligations.  These assets may not be identified and categorized 
before the project company takes over control.  Further, the condition of those 
assets and need for replacement or refurbishment may not be clear until well into 
the project.  The condition of existing assets represents a serious risk for the project 
company and one which it will be difficult to pass on to any construction 
contractor or operator.  The grantor's requirements will need to allow the project 
company sufficient flexibility to manage these conditions. 
Tariff levels and payments 
The level at which tariffs are set for services can be an extremely political issue.  
Historically, utility tariffs may have been used to subsidize certain elements of 
society, specific industries or public sector entities.  More often, public utilities are 
subsidized and tariffs are not charged, charged at very low rates or not collected.  
PPP may necessitate formal arrangements with the project company for 
government subsidies or financing, particularly where the government is not 
willing to put tariffs up to profitable levels or where substantial investment in 
capital works is needed or desired.  Though challenging, this can be a healthy 
transition for the utility, formalizing the subsidy for the water sector and rendering 
transparent the burden on the public purse represented by artificially low tariffs.  
While this will be of particular concern for the Fee vs Tariff paradigm discussed 
below, it is also important for setting tariffs and any tendency to politicize this 
function can complicate the project company’s task of invoicing consumers and 
collecting tariffs.  44
Regulation 
In order to protect consumers and ensure that key infrastructure is operated to a 
standard consistent with modern industry practice, the grantor may want to 
establish a progressive and reasonable regulatory structure, giving the regulator 
sufficient latitude to supervise the activities of the project company without 
unreasonably restricting competitiveness or the ability of the project company to 
operate or finance its activities within the context of the market.  Creating a 
regulatory structure can involve a substantial investment of resources by the 
grantor or the government.   
Equally, in view of the political, health and safety sensitivities triggered by 
infrastructure services, the grantor or some other public sector entity will need to 
monitor carefully the sector and therefore the project company's operations.  This 
may involve regulating, for example, the level of tariffs to be charged to customers, 
the performance of the project company's operations, or the standard of services to 
be delivered for public consumption.  
Regulation is of particular interest for the operation function as the regulator is 
likely to need to work closely with the project company, and to impose record 
keeping, reporting, application and other procedural requirements on the project 
company as part of the regulatory function.  This will complicate the project 
company’s management task. 
 
6.  Source of revenue 
The private sector will seek a secure revenue stream to ensure repayment of debt 
(and hence lower interest rates) and profitability over time.  Given the limited 
sources of revenues, and structure of financing, any reduction in revenues has a 
direct and significant impact on the ability of the project company to repay debt 
and on the return the shareholders will earn on their investment.  Therefore, when 
structuring a project, the private sector will want to see a clearly defined revenue 
stream, limiting as much as possible the risk that calculations of revenues or tariffs 
will not achieve the levels anticipated.    45
“Fee” relates to a revenue stream originating from one offtaker/public entity.  This 
structure provides the project company with simplified billing and collection, and 
assessment of credit risk.   
“Tariffs” relates to a revenue stream sourced from consumers.  A project company 
with a Tariffs revenue profile will face more complex billing, collection and credit 
risk due to the interfaces with consumers and the large number of offtakers. This 
complexity will complicate the due diligence process, requiring to assess demand 
profiles, collection rates, opportunities to improve billing and collection and 
assessment of late payments and the ability to sanction nonpayment and non-
performing debts. 
So, the construction and operation of a power generation facility that sells 
electricity to the local utility would be a Fee project.  While a project company 
delivering water to consumers and collecting tariffs from them would be a Tariffs 
project.  
6.1  FEE 
A  Fee arrangement provides for a purchaser (usually a sole entity) to manage 
market risk of demand and price for project output (including products and 
services).  The purchaser is generally a local utility, public service provider or 
operator which will purchase the output from the project company and then use the 
output for its own purposes or sell the output, either directly to end users or to 
other aggregators.   
The purchaser will enter into an agreement with the project company to use and 
pay for project output.  The purchase agreement defines and delimits the revenue 
stream to be received by the project company over the life of the project.  It will 
define not only the amount of the revenue stream but also when it can be 
interrupted, modified or terminated.  A common method of defining the amount to 
be paid by the purchaser to the project company is by way of a dual payment 
system, commonly including a capacity (or availability) charge and a usage (or 
offtake) charge.   
The capacity charge is that amount paid by the purchaser to the project company 
for making the project available to the purchaser and on the amount of capacity the 
project places at the disposal of the purchaser.  For example, a PPP hospital project  46
would include a capacity payment based on the availability of hospital facilities to 
the purchaser irrespective of actual usage.  
The capacity charge will compensate the project company for the fixed costs it 
incurs in producing the output including, for example, financing charges, labor and 
insurance.  Therefore, no matter what amount of output the purchaser decides to 
draw, it must pay for the fixed costs of the project company in consideration of the 
project company making the project available to the purchaser.  Where the project 
does not perform sufficiently well and does not make available the capacity 
required, then the capacity charge can be reduced.  
The usage charge is that paid for the amount of project output actually taken, or 
used, by the purchaser during the payment period.  This payment will cover the 
variable costs of operation, such as the cost of input, some or all of the equity 
return and variable maintenance costs.  The input cost may simply flow through to 
the purchaser; however, care should be taken in case the cost of input increases 
owing to inefficiency of the project, such as high heat rate in the case of a power 
plant (where the power plant requires more fuel per unit of energy than was 
intended, or where the fuel is of an insufficient quality requiring more fuel to be 
burned). 
Fee projects involve only one or a limited number of large offtakers, which 
simplifies the assessment of revenue risk, including collection risk and credit risk 
of offtakers.  It also allows long-term, financially viable offtake arrangements to 
protect investors from demand and market risks (where offtakers have more 
familiarity and are more comfortable with these risks). 
6.2  TARIFF 
A Tariff project involves greater exposure of the project company to market risk.  
When collecting tariffs from consumers, the project company will need to manage 
risks associated with: 
  Demand for output and services, including changes in demographics, 
technology and usage patterns 
  Tariff levels, in particular where a regulator sets or adjusts or approves 
adjustment of tariffs  47
  Billing, including identifying consumers, keeping track of 
consumption/metering, and delivering billing statements 
  Collection of debts due, including the physical process of collecting bills, 
the credit risk of consumers, and the design and implementation of 
penalty mechanisms for those who fail or refuse to pay. 
The demand profile is often very difficult to assess.  For example, demand for 
transportation infrastructure is influenced by competing modes of transportation, 
demographic shifts, economic conditions, the cost of the facilities to end-users, 
convenience, individual preference, speed and a number of other, often interrelated 
factors that make accurate demand forecasting difficult at best.  The inherent 
vulnerability of traffic forecasts to optimism bias was demonstrated in a Standard 
& Poors study from 2002 of traffic forecasts in user-fee based toll road schemes, in 
particular out of 32 different projects, actual traffic was on average only 70% of 
that forecast, with a large majority of projects not reaching even 90% or the 
forecast traffic.  Lenders achieved the greatest accuracy in their forecasts, but still 
only achieved an 82% performance ratio, while sponsors and investors were down 
at 66%. 
Tariff levels and payments 
The level at which tariffs are set for services can be an extremely political issue.  
Historically, utility tariffs may have been used to subsidize certain elements of 
society, specific industries or public sector entities.  More often, public utilities are 
subsidized and tariffs are not charged, charged at very low rates or not collected.  
PPP may necessitate formal arrangements with the project company for 
government subsidies or financing, particularly where the government is not 
willing to put tariffs up to profitable levels or where substantial investment in 
capital works is needed or desired.  Though challenging, this can be a healthy 
transition for the utility, formalizing the subsidy for the sector and rendering 
transparent the burden on the public purse represented by artificially low tariffs.   
Regulation 
Regulation is of particular interest for the operating function, as the regulator is 
likely to need to work closely with the project company to establish a baseline of 
data to be used for tariff setting, arguing for additional tariff increases, 
coordinating tariff with capital investment plans and responding to changes in law  48
and the requirements for improved performance through additional investment.   
This will complicate the project company’s assessment of financial viability and 
profitability of the project, which will be subject to the risk of tariffs set below 
anticipated or required levels. 
Rights of collection 
Where the project revenue stream comes from tariffs charged by the project 
company directly to consumers, the risk of collection shortfalls must be allocated.  
Where the project company is to bear this risk, the project company will need to 
have the right to collect tariffs directly from consumers and to impose sanctions on 
consumers for failure to pay tariffs, although in certain cases such sanctions may 
not be effective.  For example, in certain legal systems it may be unlawful or 
impossible to cut off the services supplied to certain public establishments, such as 
schools and hospitals, or to individual households in which, for example, resides a 
registered dialysis patient.  
Improving billing and collection can be politically challenging.  In many cases, the 
people that do not pay their bills are government agencies who may feel that public 
agencies should not pay for public services.  However, once PPP is implemented, 
those public agencies are generally expected to pay their bills.  It will be difficult 
for a private sector operator to confront a government agency (for example, the 
Ministry of Defense or the Police Department) and demand payment.  
Exclusivity 
Where the project company's revenue source is to be generated from the tariffs 
collected from consumers in a given area, or where the rate of use of services 
consumed dictates a part of the payment stream, the project company may seek an 
exclusive mandate to provide the services within that area.  This may be difficult 
for the grantor to accept where it wishes to cultivate competition and create as 
realistic a free market as possible.  The grantor will need to consider carefully the 
issue of exclusivity and where exceptions to such exclusivity might arise. 
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7.  Application of the Model to the Case Studies 
The following applies the classification model to a number of case studies to see 
how projects from different regions and sectors can be categorized in practice and 
how this will help compare across these different projects.  
  Dhabol power generation project 
  East Manila water concession 
  Thames water privatization 
  Santiago – Valparaiso tollroad 
  Pulkovo airport 
  Athens airport 
  Royal Victoria Infirmary and Freeman Hospital 
  TANESCO management contract 
  Cartagena water project 
  Southern Africa regional gas project  
  São Paulo metro line 4 
  Skikda desalination project 
  Zagreb-Macelj tollroad 
  Panagarh to Palsit tollroad 
  Orlovski Tunnel concession  
These are well known projects with sufficient information available publicly to 
permit open discussion without betraying confidentiality, and represent a cross-
section of sectors and project structures.  50
These case studies cut across some familiar lines, in particular those that 
demonstrate common terminology confusion. Projects that are usually thought of 
as relatively standard “Build-Operate-Transfer” or “BOT” projects turn out to have 
different characteristics, differences that might be missed when using classical 
terminology. Some of these “BOT” projects are actually closer in design and 
commercial drivers to some arrangements often thought of as “concessions”. 
Equally, the case studies demonstrate the significant differences between various 
forms of “concession”, for example 
  A Russian tunnel “concession” – New-Build-Finance-User-Fee 
  A Greek airport “concession” – Existing-Build-Finance-User-Tariff 
  A Chilean road “concession” – Existing-Refurbish-Finance-User-Tariff 
  A Filipino water “concession” – Existing-Refurbish-Finance-User-Tariff 
  A Brazilian Metro “concession” – New-Finance-User-Tariff 
The case studies also show the important variances within sectors, and similarities 
between some projects in different sectors that are not often considered when 
analyzing the opportunity for cross-fertilization in the design of PPP projects. For 
example, the case studies include:  
  Two hospitals, one with the project company delivering just the facilities, 
with the grantor providing medical services (New-Build-Finance-Bulk-
Fee).  The second has the project company providing all services 
(Existing-Build-Finance-User-Fee).  
  Two power projects, one a classic IPP (New-Build-Finance-Bulk-Fee), 
and the other the outsourcing of management functions (Existing-User-
Fee) and one gas pipeline (New-Build-Finance-Bulk-Fee).  
  Four water projects, one called a concession (Existing-Refurbish-Finance-
User-Tariff), one called a privatization (Existing-Finance-User-Tariff), 
one called a PPP project (Existing-Refurbish-Finance-User-Tariff) and 
one a desalination plant (New-Build-Finance-Bulk-Fee).  51
  Two airports, one a new build (Existing-Build-Finance-User-Tariff) and 
the other a refurbishment of an existing airport (Existing-Refurbish-
Finance-User-Tariff), one metro (Existing-Finance-User-Tariff), and three 
toll roads, two toll-based refurbishments (Existing-Refurbish-Finance-
User-Tariff) and the other an annuity or availability payment new build 
(New-Refurbish-Finance-User-Fee). 
  The model also shows the structural similarities between the Manila water 
concession (Existing-Refurbish-Finance-User-Tariff), Thames water 
privatization (Existing-Finance-User-Tariff), and the Cartagena water PPP 
(Existing-Refurbish-Finance-User-Tariff), yet they are each known by a 
different name: concession, privatization and PPP respectively. 
7.1  DHABOL POWER CORPORATION, INDIA  
Pursuing a policy of economic liberalization by the Indian government to open up 
the electricity sector to foreign investment, a senior Indian delegation invited 
Enron, along with other international investors to participate in the country’s sector 
reform. As a result, the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for the Dhabol Power 
Project was signed in 1993 for a $2.8 billion combined-cycle 2,000 megawatt LNG 
power plant in Maharashtra, India’s third largest state. Under the renegotiated PPA 
in 1995, Enron, GE and Bechtel, through their 8-1-1 joint-venture Dhabol Power 
Corporation (DPC), signed a take or pay off-take agreement to sell all the 
electricity to Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) for 20 years. The MSEB 
PPA is counter-guaranteed by the state and federal governments.  
Since the Dhabol project went through various iterations, this paper will use the 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves the construction of a power plant facility 
on a Greenfield basis by the project company and assumes no previous or existing 
business or customers. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Build: The project company, Dhabol 
Power Company (DPC), assumes significant risk in association with the 
construction of a new power plant; these involve inherent risks during the 
construction of a major infrastructure project, including geological and design risk, 
cost overruns, delays etc.  
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project entitles significant contribution 
from the consortium in the form of equity and diverse sources of financing 
including commercial banks, export credit agencies (ECAs).  
SERVICE DELIVERY – Bulk: Project Company DPC is responsible for 
delivering services directly to a sole offtaker, in this case public entity Maharashtra 
State Electricity Board (MSEB), and does assume additional responsibility for 
customer service 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Fee: Since revenue stream for the project originates 
from a sole offtaker, in this case public entity Maharashtra State Electricity Board 
(MSEB), and the project company does not assume responsibility for customer 
service. 
7.2  EAST MANILA WATER CONCESSION, PHILIPPINES 
In February 1997 the Government of the Philippines awarded a contract to the 
Manila Water Company (MWC), a consortium lead by Ayala Corporation 
(Philippines) to operate and expand the water supply and waste water system of 
Manila’s East zone, comprising a total population of 4.5 million and about 70% of 
the total city coverage.  
Under the 25-year contract, MWC was responsible for the provision of water and 
sewerage and to expand services to additional households according to specific and 
pre-agreed set of annual targets defined by zone; MWC also assumed a large 
portion of the debt burden of the public utility (MWSS) and offered large rebates 
on the existing tariffs.   53
Despite high investment costs, MWC was able to make a remarkable turnaround in 
service access and reliability, water loss reductions and overall operational 
efficiency; MWC also achieved financial turnaround with increasing profitability 
from 2001 onwards leading to a successful IPO, and subsequent competition for 
PPP contracts in the region.  
The East Manila Water concession has often been hailed as the largest water 
concession in the world and it is an example of a successful public-private 
partnership despite its high investment costs. The transaction has been recognized 
for its transparent bidding procedure, a best practice example for its robust and 
transparent regulation, its ability to survive the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
most of all, for achieving a remarkable turnaround in service access and reliability, 
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BUSINESS – Existing:  The project involves taking over management of Manila’s 
existing utility,  the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Services (MWSS) by 
Manila Water Company Inc (MWC). Under the contract MWC was responsible for 
responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services to existing customers 
for the city’s East Zone; MWC also agreed to expand service to additional 
households according to specific and pre-agreed set of annual targets defined by 
zone. When MWC took over operations in 1997 it faced major coverage and 
quality problems inherited, including MWSS’s precarious financial situation. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Refurbish:  The project company 
assumes refurbishment and expansion of existing assets owned by MWSS and the 
risks related to their current condition.   54
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project required very large commitments 
from MWC which included $ 2.72 billion in investments and $ 222 million in 
concession fees. Along with the contract, was MWC’s responsibility of assuming a 
portion of the utility’s outstanding liabilities in the form of equity and diverse 
sources of financing including commercial banks. The transaction is therefore 
categorized as “Finance.” 
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: MWC deliver services directly to consumers and 
is responsible for collection and billing obligations as well as customer service. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Tariffs: Revenue stream originates from consumers; 
the project company assumes collection and billing obligations as well as customer 
service.  
7.3  THAMES WATER, UK 
Thames Water plc is the largest water and wastewater services company in the 
United Kingdom, with more than 13 million customers in England and Wales. The 
company was in hands of the public sector (Thames Water Authority) until 1989 
when it was privatized with transfer of its regulatory, river management and 
navigation responsibilities to the National Rivers Authority, which later became 
part of the Environment Agency. The newly privatized water industry remained 
strictly subject to governmental control and regulation, including annual specific 
quality standards of the UK and the European Commission, and a mandatory 
capital investment program to improve existing inadequate infrastructure inherited 
by Thames. Over time, the company diversified its portfolio and took over several 
water supply utilities and also started to offer consulting, infrastructure, project 
management, engineering, and maintenance services. Thames Water was acquired 
by the RWE Group, a German conglomerate in 2001 and then sold to Kemble 
Water Ltd., formed by a group of investors led by Australia's Macquarie Group, in 
December 2006. Like other water companies, Thames saw its share of controversy 
as it tried to strike the balance between the public duty of a monopoly utility, the 














Bulk  Fee 
Existing Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing: The transaction involved the privatization of the Thames 
Water, which until 1989 was in hands of the public sector (and referred as Thames 
Water Authority). The company therefore had an existing demand from about 7 
million customers, an existing stream of revenues and tested cost data. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – N/A 
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: Since the transaction involved transferring 
ownership of a the company’s assets (divestiture) to private sector investors it is 
categorized as Finance. 
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: Thames Water deliver services directly to 
consumers and is responsible for collection and billing obligations as well as 
customer service 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Tariffs: The utility is responsible for billing and 
collecting revenues directly from its large number of customers.   
7.4  SANTIAGO - VALPARAÍSO – VIÑA DEL MAR TOLL ROAD 
(RUTAS DEL PACIFICO), CHILE 
The Route 68 concession, joining Santiago with Valparaíso and Viña del Mar is an 
innovative example of a successful example of the large concession program which 
has been carried out by Chilean Government since the early 1990’s. The project 
consists on the engineering, construction, upgrade, operation, and maintenance of 
the existing 109 km Ruta 68 toll road, which connects Santiago with the Port of 
Valparaiso and the Viña del Mar region in Chile. The total financing costs for the 
project was about US$ 427 million, of which about US$ 103 million was provided 
by sponsors ACS and Sacyr.  The project used a least present value of revenue  56
(LPVR) auction mechanism and was the first example in which urban highways 
were implemented with free-flow inter-operable toll charges with four different 
project companies. Under the scheme, the regulator fixes user fees and announces a 
discount rate, and the franchise is awarded to the firm that bids the least present 
value of toll revenue. The franchise ends when the present value of toll revenue is 
equal to the winning bid. The LPVR mechanism allows for fair compensation if 
parties wish to terminate the contract early. The concession started in August 1998 












Bulk  Fee 
Existing  Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing: Rutas del Pacifico entails the improvement of an existing 
toll road of 109 km between the capital Santiago and Valparaiso, plus the 
construction of a new 20 km road section (Troncal Sur) connecting several towns 
with the city of Viña del Mar. The project also includes the maintenance of 
existing Route 60 and construction of two 5km tunnels. The existing highway was 
built and maintained by the Chilean ministry of public works. Tolls were charged 
to users, therefore there was an existing demand and revenue stream derived from 
the project. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Refurbish: The project company is 
responsible for the construction of a new 20 km section and auxiliary civil works; 
however, the main component is the overall expansion and improvement of the 
existing 109 km Santiago-Valparaiso highway.  
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The total financing costs for the project was 
about US$ 427 million of which about $103 million was provided by sponsors 
ACS Chile S.A. and Sacyr Chile S.A. As part of the financing, Rutas del Pacifico 
(SPV) issued bonds in local currency for about $ 75 million backstopped with an 
IADB guarantee.   57
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: The project company delivers services directly to 
the toll road users and is responsible for handling customer service. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Fee: The project company obtains cash flows 
directly from the toll roads users, mainly from light vehicles (75%) in this 
particular case.  
7.5  THE PULKOVO AIRPORT EXPANSION PROJECT, RUSSIA 
In early 2008, the St. Petersburg City Government together with the Pulkovo 
Airport Company initiated the bidding process for a 30 year PPP project to expand, 
operate and maintain the Pulkovo International Airport (“Pulkovo”).  
Pulkovo, located 16 km south of St. Petersburg, is Russia’s fourth busiest airport in 
terms of passenger flow, servicing over 6 million people in 2007 and 66 airlines 
regularly. The project aims to address the airport’s rising capacity constraints and 
cater to forecasted growths in passenger and cargo traffic expected in the next 30 
years. The project involves the construction of a centralized passenger terminal 
which will concentrate all main operations of scheduled and charter passengers, 
both international and domestic; the reconstruction of certain other existing 
buildings and structures of the landside facilities; construction of new buildings 
and structures of the landside facilities (hotel, parking, access roads); and 
reconstruction of part of existing airside facilities (expansion of the airfield, new 












Bulk  Fee 
Existing  Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing: The transaction entails the expansion of the existing 
Pulkovo Airport of St. Petersburg to address the airport’s rising capacity 
constraints and cater to forecasted growths in passenger and cargo traffic expected 
in the next 30 years. The project company will essentially take over an existing  58
business with a tested and existing (but growing) air traffic demand, as well as 
historic financial records and stream of revenues.  
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Refurbish: The project entails the 
construction of a centralized passenger terminal and the reconstruction of certain 
other existing buildings and structures of the landside facilities. The project 
company assumes risks such the existing condition and latent defects of the assets.  
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: Although it is unclear the financial plan of the 
project, it is likely that it will require a combination of both equity and debt from 
the project company, who is yet to be defined.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: It is envisaged that under the proposed structure 
the project company will provide services directly to its customers from airside 
(airlines) and landside operations. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Tariffs: The project company will obtain revenues 
directly from users / customers airside (airlines) and landside operations.  
7.6  ATHENS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, GREECE 
In July 1995, the Government of Greece and a private consortium led by 
HOCHTIEF signed an Airport Development Agreement (ADA) and entered into a 
30-year contract for the development and operation of the Athens International 
Airport (AIA), a new airport at Spata, a town about 33 km to the northeast of 
Athens. The airport replaced the previous congested Hellenikon Airport. The 
concession was initiated in 1996, following the establishment of Athens 
International Airport (AIA), as special-purpose Company owned by the Greek 
Government and private investors. The state-of-the-art airport has been serving the 
Greek capital since it started commercial operations in March 28
th, 2001 following 
a construction time of 51 months.  The project is acclaimed as the first successfully 
completed PPP structure for a greenfield European airport. Total investment costs 












New  Build 
Finance 
Bulk  Fee 
Existing Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing: The project involves the construction of a new airport at 
Spata, a town about 30 km gto the northeast of Athens to replace the previous 
congested Hellenikon Airport. However, the project company is taking over an 
existing and known business with tested demand, previous financial data including 
revenue streams, operational costs and liabilities, as well as Hellenikon’s existing 
employees and contractual obligations.  
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Build: The project involves the 
construction of a new airport facility with its associated construction risks 
including, design risks, cost overruns, completion delays which could significantly 
impact the project company’s cash flow, its ability to repay debt and the overall 
project’s outcome. 
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project financing includes equity 
contribution from sponsors as well as a substantial portion of debt (50%) provided 
by the European Investment Bank. The project therefore is classified as Finance 
under the categorization model.  
 SERVICE DELIVERY – User: Airport services are delivered directly to users. 
Operational and traffic risks of the project was almost fully allocated to the project 
company, without a minimum level of traffic guaranteed in the contract. The state- 
owned flag carrier (Olympic) represents about 60% of the airport traffic which 
poses a significant risk for the project company due to the fragile financial 
condition of the airline. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Tariffs: Operational and traffic risks of the project 
was almost fully allocated to the project company, without a minimum level of 
traffic guaranteed in the contract. Revenues from the project are derived directly  60
from users (passengers and airlines). The state- owned flag carrier (Olympic) 
represents about 60% of the airport traffic which poses a significant risk for the 
project company due to the fragile financial condition of the airline. Non-airside 
commercial activities of the airport (duty free zone, parking, restaurants, business 
center etc) account for about 20% of the total revenues of the project company.   
7.7  THE  ROYAL  VICTORIA  INFIRMARY AND FREEMAN 
HOSPITAL, UK 
In the spring of 2003, a consortium led by Equion won preferred bidder status for 
the development of the Freeman Hospital and Royal Victoria Infirmary in 
Newcastle. The Royal Victoria Infirmary and Freeman Hospital is a typical 
example of a successful Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK’s health sector 
which has been a key innovation in public sector management in the United 
Kingdom. Under the PFI scheme, the private concessionaire, Healthcare Support 
(Newcastle) Finance, will provide the designing and construction of facilities, non-
clinical services and maintenance required over a term of 38 years (8-year 
construction period plus a 30-year operation period); a fixed unitary payment will 
be paid by the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospital NHS Trust (grantor) to the 
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Existing  Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – New:  The project involves a combination of building new facilities 
and refurbishing existing ones. However, the refurbishment area corresponds only 
to 6,700 (8%) squared meters compared to 76,300 (92%) square meters of new 
construction.  
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CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Build:  Capital expenditure requirements 
for the project are in their majority focused on the construction of new 
buildings/facilities. The transaction implies significant construction risks including 
cost overruns and completion delays which may affect the project’s profitability.  
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance:  The project uses a significant contribution 
from the consortium in the form of equity and a substantial debt portion (debt 
equity ratio is 92:8). There are diverse sources of financing including a bond issue 
by Royal Bank of Canada and EIB loan guaranteed by XL Capital Assurance.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – Bulk: Healthcare Support (Newcastle) Finance, the 
project operator, is responsible for delivering services directly to the Trust 
(grantor).  There are no customer service responsibilities or any specific social 
risks for the operator. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Fee: The revenue stream for the project originates 
exclusively from the grantor (Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospital NHS Trust) under a 
fixed-price unitary payment to the project company in exchange for the services 
provided throughout the concession term.  
7.8  TANESCO- NETGROUP SOLUTIONS 
In 2002, the Government of Tanzania entered into a two-year contract with 
NETGroup Solutions (Pty) Ltd. of South Africa for the management of the 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO), the country’s national 
utility company. The contract focused on improving the financial and operational 
efficiency of TANESCO and preparing the utility for subsequent privatization at 
end of contract term. A very successful with first phase of the contract focused on 
billing and collection ended in May 2004 and was subsequently renewed by the 
government for another of two and a half years. In total, the contract spanned 56 
months from May 2002 to December 2006, including an initial phase of 27 
months. Total contract payments for the two phases were estimated between US$ 
18 and 19 million.  
Following the expiration of second phase in December 2006, the Government 
decided not to renew the management contract but to continue with full public 
ownership of TANESCO. Although privatization was not achieved, the contract 
was successful in improving TANESCO’s financial and administrative commercial 












Bulk  Fee 
Existing Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing:  The project involves management of an existing utility 
(TANESCO) by the project company (NETGroup Solutions). The contract 
therefore implies taking over the utility’s customer base, previous undertakings, 
employees, and particularly in this case, TANESCO debt burden and fragile 
financial standing.  
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – N/A 
PRIVATE FUNDING – N/A  
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: The project company assumes collection and 
billing obligations, interfacing directly with customers.   
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Fee: The project’s revenue stream originates from a 
performance based fee from TANESCO.   
7.9  AGUAS DE CARTAGENA  PUBLIC  -PRIVATE  PARTNERSHIP, 
COLOMBIA 
In 1995, a public-private partnership with mixed-ownership  was set up to provide 
water supply and sanitation to Cartagena de Indias, a city of almost 900,000 people 
on the northern coast of Colombia, which serves as the capital of one of the 
country’s departments (states), an economic hub and a popular tourist destination. 
The new mixed enterprise under the name of Aguas de Cartagena or AGUACAR, 
combined the resources of the public works department and Aguas de Barcelona, a 
Spanish water firm. Under a long term contract (26 years) AGUACAR assumed 
responsibility for O&M and partial investment; assets remained under the 
Municipality’s ownership. Total financing cost of works was estimated at US$ 236 
million (67% provided by AGUACAR and 33% by the Municipality / State).  63
Prior to 1995, water/wastewater service was operated by the Public Municipal 
Utility EPD. The utility was extremely unreliable and plagued with chronic 
inefficiency, excessive political interference, poor maintenance, poor service 
delivery weak commercial and financial management. Less than 70 percent of the 
city’s households had water connections and less than 55 percent had sewage 
service. Between 1996 and 2006, following AGUACAR’s management water 
supply coverage increased from 74% to almost universal coverage and sewer 
coverage went up from 62 to79 %. Cartagena achieved this expansion of coverage 
despite a jump in its population during that period with the arrival of poor rural 
migrants.  
One of the key considerations is the mixed-ownership of the company which was 
able to achieve almost universal access to piped water despite the massive arrival 
of poor rural migrants in the city, end acute water rationing in the city, and the 
ability to turn a bankrupt utility into a model water company. The AGUACAR PPP 
is also an example of the pragmatic and gradual approach with extensive use of 
community bulk-supply scheme that allowed serving illegal migrants from the 













Bulk  Fee 
Existing  Refurbish  User  Tariffs 
BUSINESS – Existing: The transaction entailed a public-private partnership with 
mixed-ownership set up to provide water supply and sanitation to the city of 
Cartagena in response to an unsustainable crisis due to the highly inefficient local 
utility (EDP) which was liquidated and existing services fully transferred to the 
new company AGUACAR. 
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CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Refurbish:  Under the contract 
AGUACAR assumed the responsibility of improving and expanding the quality of 
the service. In particular AGUACAR modernized the existing infrastructure for 
water and sewage and introduced automated control of processes and operations. 
However, assets remained the property of the municipality. 
 PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The transaction required upfront investment 
commitments of more than US$ 230 million to improve water service, to increase 
quality and coverage. 
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: The project company assumed billing and 
collection, as well as customer service. 
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Tariffs:  Project revenues derived from existing 
customers. The company assumed billing and collection, as well as customer 
service.  
7.10  THE SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL GAS PROJECT 
The Southern Africa Regional Gas Project is the first large scale energy project to 
capitalize on Mozambique’s rich natural gas resources, which were first discovered 
in 1956. It consists of an “upstream project”, which includes the development of 
the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique and the construction of a central 
processing facility, and a “downstream project”, which includes the construction, 
operation and maintenance of an 865km pipeline to transport the gas to Sasol’s 
Secunda plant in South Africa, with a capital expenditure of approximately $1bn.  
Sasol Limited is the primary sponsor of the Project from gas field development in 
Mozambique to the end user sales in South Africa. It provides full debt service 
support to the two project companies (SPT and ROMPCO) through ship or pay 
arrangements and therefore assumes all project related commercial risks as well as 
a portion of Mozambique political risks. The Mozambique political risk coverage 
is primarily provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South Africa 
(ECIC), MIGA – partially reinsured by SACE of Italy and EFIC of Australia, the 
World Bank through a Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG), and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). 
The Southern Africa Regional Gas Project is an example of a successful cross-
border transaction despite its complexity in the design and implementation process  65
and highly diverse stakeholder groups. The transaction was key to introduce 
international banks to Mozambique and raise the country’s profile and set high 
standards for the government. The project is also an example of World Bank Group 
coordination and cooperation involving two IBRD partial risk guarantees 
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BUSINESS - New:  Under the model the project is classified as “new business” as 
the project involves the construction of the two individual and integrated sub-
projects, that is, the development of the Pande and Temane gas fields in 
Mozambique and the construction of a central processing facility (called upstream 
project), and, the construction of the pipeline to transport the gas to Sasol’s 
Secunda plant in South Africa (called “downstream or pipeline project”). There is 
no previous record of demand data, revenue stream or contractual obligations or 
customer base. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS – Build: The project company undertakes 
the development and construction of new assets (gas fields, processing facilities 
and the actual pipeline) on a Greenfield basis. Being a large and complex cross-
border transaction involving a full spectrum of stakeholders and several groups in 
both Mozambique and South Africa made SASOL a project riskier from the 
construction perspective due to potential engineering and geological problems, cost 
overruns and delays.  
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The two individual and integrated sub-projects 
required upfront financing from sponsors and large commercial debt facilities, 
which were partially covered by the World Bank, MIGA and ECAs.   66
SERVICE DELIVERY – Bulk:  The gas is transported to South Africa by project 
sponsor Sasol thorough a 865 km pipeline from the Temane and Pande gas 
reserves in Mozambique.   
SOURCE OF REVENUE – Fee: Project revenues are obtained from the purchase 
of natural gas from the pipeline by Sasol in South Africa.  The gas is transported 
by project sponsor Sasol thorough a 865 km pipeline from the Temane and Pande 
gas reserves in Mozambique.   
7.11  SAO PAULO METRO LINE 4, BRAZIL 
The new Metro Line 4 will be a principal commuter route that runs southwest to 
northeast through metropolitan São Paulo, connecting residential neighborhoods to 
important commercial districts adding approximately 21 percent in additional 
capacity to the metro system across low, medium and higher income populations. 
The project includes two main contracts: (a) a turnkey contract for the provision of 
civil works and electrification for the 12.8 km of metro line
14 and (b) a concession 
to operate the system for 30 years, in exchange for the provision of the rolling 
stock and systems, financed mainly by the private sector and the State. This case 
study analysis focuses on the latter PPP project component.  
Total project costs are estimated at US$ 398.55 million with about US$ 82.95 
million equity contribution from sponsors (21%). Total debt of US$ 315.60 (79%) 
is split in two tranches, a $69.2 million, 15-year A loan from the IADB, and a $240 
million, 12-year B loan, and led by IADB, from Banco Santander, SMBC, KfW, 
Banco Espirito Santo, BBVA as lead arrangers and Société Générale and WestLB 
as co-lead arrangers. The project was not eligible for support from the Brazilian 
government's development bank, BNDES, because the trains for the project were 
manufactured outside of the country. 
The Project was awarded in November 2006 to a consortium (Via Quatro)
15 led by 
Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias (CCR) pursuant to an international public 
                                                 
14    This component is finance by the World Bank, JOBIC and State of Sao Paulo 
15  The consortium (and sponsors) consists of CCR (58%), Mitsui (10%), Montgomery 
Participações S.A. of Portugal (30%), Benito Roggio Transportes S.A. of Argentina 
(1%), and RATP Développement S.A of France (1%) 
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bidding process with the Government of the State of Sao Paulo. This was a 
landmark event, and the first PPP signed by any public sector agency in Brazil 
since the passage o f the new Brazil’s PPP legislation in 2004. Under the terms of 
the PPP contract, operator ViaQuatro will be responsible for the provision of 
rolling stock, trains and technical equipment, and the operation and maintenance of 
a 12.8 km metro line (Metro Line 4) in Sao Paulo during a 30-year concession 
term. The state of São Paulo's government, under its civil works authority, is 
responsible for the construction of the required civil infrastructure works which 
includes various stations, tunnels and railways. The state performs such civil works 
before turning over the supply, operation and maintenance to ViaQuatro.  
The concession was awarded on the basis of a low bid for required availability 
payments; it also benefits from a minimum revenue guarantee and revenue-sharing 
threshold, protecting the concessionaire from low revenues, but providing the state 
with revenue sharing if use is higher than projections. Most of the consortium’s 
income will come from passenger tariffs, but should this fall below the projected 
levels the government must top it up. However, if income is greater than expected 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves the construction of a new line for the 
current metro system in Sao Paulo. The demand for the metro is known, traffic on 
the new line is unknown. The project company is responsible only for this new 
line. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATION – N/A 
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PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance:  The project financing includes equity 
contribution from sponsors of about US$ 83 million (21%). There is also a 
substantial portion of debt in the form of an A loan from IADB and a B loan, led 
by IADB, from several commercial banks. The project therefore is classified as 
Finance.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: Project operator will deliver service directly to 
the metro’s customers; it is also responsible for collection and billing obligations as 
well as customer service.  
SOURCE OF REVENUES – Tariffs: Most of the consortium’s income will come 
from passenger tariffs, with a minimum revenue guarantee and revenue-sharing 
threshold, protecting the concessionaire from low revenues, but providing the state 
with revenue sharing if use is higher than projections. 
7.12  SKIKDA SEAWATER DESALINATION PLANT, ALGERIA 
In an effort to address the severe shortage of fresh water due to increasing demand, 
drought, and pollution, the Government of Algeria decided to embark on an 
ambitious plan to construct up to 28 large-scale desalination plants along the 1,300 
km coastline of Algeria before year 2020. The Skikda Desalination Plant, one of 
the projects under the plan, is located in the northern part of Algeria (Mediter-
ranean Sea) about 2 km east of the city of Skikda (about 500 km east of the city of 
Algiers). The project consists of a seawater desalination plant producing 100,000 
cubic meters of water a day using reverse osmosis (RO), provide potable water 
needs of 700,000 equivalent inhabitants and petrochemical industries nearby.  
The total cost of the project was estimated at US$ 110.6 million (80% debt, 20% 
equity). The project was financed by a local government-financed bank, the 
Banque Nationale d’Algerie (BNA) which provided the Spanish consortium with a 
17-year term loan in local currency at a very favorable fixed rate. The terms of the 
nonrecourse long-term funding by the BNA, allowed the project to eliminate 
foreign exchange rate risk and permitted it to achieve a ratio of debt to equity of 
80:20. The Algerian Energy Company (AEC) participated 40% in the equity.  69
The Algerian Energy Company (AEC) awarded the project in April 2004 to 
Spanish GEIDA Consortium
16 for a 25-year contract. The water produced is to be 
sold on a fixed plus variable tariff scheme as stipulated under a water purchase 
agreement with Sonatrach and Algérienne des Eaux (Algerian government-owned 
companies for exploitation and management of hydrocarbon and water 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves the construction of a new desalination 
plant on green field basis. There are no previous data, employees, or undertakings 
requiring due diligence by investors. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATION – Build: The transaction implies significant 
construction risks for Aguas de Skikda, including cost overruns and completion 
delays which may affect the project’s profitability. These risks are however, well 
mitigated considering the experience and reputation of the company and sponsors 
in project of this nature. 
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project is financed through a combination 
of equity from sponsors and financing from BNA, a local government-owned bank 
in Algeria.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – Bulk:  The project company is required to deliver 
services directly to project off takers ADE and Sonatrach. 
                                                 
16    The Geida Consortium is constituted by Abengoa’s Befesa and Codesa (50%); 
Actividades de Construcción y Servicios (25%) through Cobra-Tedagua; Sacyr (25%) 
through Sacyr.  70
SOURCE OF REVENUES – Fee: The source of the revenue stream originates 
directly from a fee under the Water Purchase Agreement. 
7.13  ZAGREB-MACELJ TOLL ROAD, CROATIA 
Privately financed rehabilitation and new construction of a 60 km long toll 
motorway section from the Croatian capital Zagreb to Macelj on the Slovenian 
border.  The road is part of the Transeuropean road network and a key component 
in the Pyhrn corridor, which will create an unbroken link from Athens and Istanbul 
to Western Europe. 
Construction lasted 35 months, from July 2004 through May 2007. The 
construction phases comprised widening of the existing motorway from Zagreb to 
Krapina from 2 to 4 lanes and the new construction of a 19.4 km long 4-lane 
section from Krapina to Macelj, including 
  Total length of the 15 main bridges: 5,000 m 
  Total length of the 6 tunnels: 5,900 m 
The project was undertaken by a Joint Venture between Strabag International 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves the construction of a new toll road on 
green field basis, with no hard data on traffic or other demand risk.  
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATION – Refurbish:  The transaction implies 
significant construction risks for the refurbishment of existing road and 
construction of new road. The Government provides the land.  71
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project is financed through a combination 
of equity from sponsors and financing from commercial lenders.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – Users: The project company provides access to the road 
to users directly. 
SOURCE OF REVENUES – Tariff: The project company charges tolls to users. 
7.14  PANAGARH TO PALSIT TOLLROAD, INDIA 
The Rs 400-crore (over $90 million) project involves strengthening of the existing 
two lanes and constructing two more lanes on the 64-km-long stretch between 
Panagarh and Palsit on NH-2 in West Bengal, it forms a part of Delhi - Kolkatta 
section of Golden Quadrilateral.  
Malaysia's Gamuda-WCT won the project through competitive tender from the 
National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) on an annuity basis. In all 10 
entities bid for this project, including L&T, HCC, GMR Group, Jaiprakash 
Industries, IRCON and Punj Lloyd. 
The concession period of 17 years and 4 months commences seven months from 
the date of the Concession Agreement. Construction must be completed within 28 
months. Thereafter, the consortium, which will form an SPV for this purpose, will 
maintain the highway for the remainder of the concession period. As per the 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves a new road.  72
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATION – Refurbish:  The project company is 
responsible for the construction and refurbishment of the road. 
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project is financed through a combination 
of equity from sponsors and commercial financing.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – User: The project company provides access to the road 
to individual users. 
SOURCE OF REVENUES – Fee: The project company revenues are derived 
from performance based fees paid by the Government. 
7.15  ORLOVSKI TUNNEL CONCESSION, RUSSIA 
The Orlovski tunnel will connect the centre of the city of Saint Petersburg with its 
northeast section. It crosses the Něva River at the historic location of Smolny. It is 
anticipated that approximately 60,000 vehicles will pass through it daily. The 
estimated investment costs are approximately 1.5 billion US Dollars. The bidding 
process is currently underway, with 4 international consortium having pre-
qualified.  The bidders must propose designs for three lanes in each direction, but 
the decision to use one or two tunnels, and using tunnel boring technology or 
submerged sections is left to the bidders.  Bidders must provide a mixture of 
manual and electronic tolling. 
The revenue for the project company will be based on an availability payment from 
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BUSINESS – New: The project involves a new tunnel under the Neva River, in St. 
Petersburg. 
CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATION – Build: The project company is responsible 
for the construction of a greenfield tunnel. 
PRIVATE FUNDING – Finance: The project is financed through a combination 
of Government subsidy, equity from sponsors and commercial financing.  
SERVICE DELIVERY – User:  The project company provides access to the 
tunnel to individual users. 
SOURCE OF REVENUES – Fee: The project company revenues are derived 
from performance based fees paid by the Government. 
 
 